Tuesday, January 10, 2006

THE JOY OF BAITING

BY

TOM MOLLOY

<>I confess that I am an incurable, unreformed baiter. My wife thinks of baiting as putting people down. I think of it as giving people the chance to be amusing. I am not going to define “baiting” because from the examples below it will be clear what the term means. Let m share some of my baiting adventures with you. <>

Geographic Mischief: When people hear that I spent two years in Somalia, their curiosity often leads to questions. The most frequently asked question is, “Where is Somalia?” A few months ago, two elementary school teachers asked me this question at a social gathering. Earlier in the evening, these two had expressed their revealing opinion that IQ test scores were meaningless. People who have high IQ scores generally don’t disparage these tests. The stage was set. The temptation to bait was irresistible. I looked around and the coast was clear because my wife was nowhere in sight. To tell the truth, I was rather irked that two teachers, even those with a low IQ, didn’t know where Somalia was. I responded that Somalia was bordered by France in the North, Paraguay in the East and Latvia in the West. They nodded appreciatively. An acquaintance wincing at my specious geography looked at me as if I had lost my mind. A few minutes later our two aspiring geographers retreated into the crowd. I winked at him and walked away. <>

Bagger Baiting: Once in a while I like to enliven the supermarket experience. When we buy gallon containers of water, the bagger usually asks, “Would you like your water in a bag? I usually answer, “No, thank you”. But when I have the urge to bait, I answer, “No, don’t put the water in a bag, leave it in the bottles. Those plastic bags leak.” The baggers’ reactions vary from ignoring the dotty old fool to giving explanations in baby-talk. <>

THOSE WHO LIVE BY THE SWORD……........................................

If you engage in baiting, you must be prepared to get as good or better than you give. The next two baiting episodes illustrate this point.

<>So Much for Dumb Blonde Jokes. A few years ago, on the checkout line at the supermarket, I discovered that I had forgotten my debit card at home. Fortunately, I had my checkbook. I handed the check to a very pretty young blonde cashier. She said she needed my phone number to write it on the check. I told her that I didn’t give out my phone number because women fought to get it and besieged me with phone calls. She didn’t bat an eye. In a very professional manner, she replied that she really had to have my telephone number. I gave it to her. As she handed me the receipt, she leaned towards me and whispered, “I promise I won’t call you.” Ouch! <>

Flight Attendant’s Revenge. Years ago on an Eastern Airlines flight, the flight attendant (at that time called a stewardess) served me a piece of chicken that had a sickly grey pallor. I called the flight attendant back, pointed out the ghastly appearance of the chicken and remarked to her that I would like to see the chicken’s autopsy report. The attendant replied, “Sir, there’s no need for an autopsy report. It died of fright when it saw what was sitting in your seat. Pow!

<>Two personal favorites:

Baiting the Boss: In the early 90s I traveled to several countries in the Far East with my boss, a brilliant man, who was a very inexperienced traveler. We finished our visits and took a long, tiring, overnight flight to Hawaii, where we were scheduled to spend two days being debriefed. We got off the plane and headed towards the baggage claim area. As we passed a currency exchange booth, I said to my boss, “If you don’t have any local currency, you had better get at least $100 worth of “luaus”. He thanked me for my solicitude and headed to the exchange booth window. It’s a good thing he had a sense of humor.

<>General Baiting: Several months ago I found myself seated next to a retired general on a plane. He was a great conversationalist. I really enjoyed our discussion of current events. At a lull in the conversation, he said that, once beverage service began, he would like to offer me a beer. At this point I received an inspiration from the Baiting Muse. I replied, “General I’d love a beer, but the medicine I take for blood pressure doesn’t mix well with alcohol. I told him that several months ago, the last time I drank beer, I became insanely aggressive and attacked a man. I added that I had bitten part of the man’s ear off. They hadn’t made him a general for nothing. He immediately concluded that it would be best if I had a soft drink instead. Much to the general’s chagrin, when the flight attendant asked what I wanted to drink, I told her the general had offered me a beer and I would take him up on his kind offer. I can’t describe the look on his face. He muttered something about rest room and started to get up. I burst out laughing and explained that I been putting him on. <>

And life goes on as I strive to become a master baiter..

Saturday, January 07, 2006

The Red Herring Called Training, Rx for Iraq

By

<>THOMAS MOLLOY

<>
<>I spent forty years in the field of training and let me tell you that there is something fishy about the Bush administration’s statements about training Iraqi soldiers to replace our soldiers. The premise is that, as we train Iraqi soldiers, our troops will gradually turn over the responsibility for the defense and security of Iraq to the Iraqi government. It sounds like a logical approach, but I smell a rat. I am not implying deceit. I don’t think that the administration really understands the nature of the problem.

<>In my experience, when job performance is not satisfactory, management’s first thought is that employees need training. Paradoxically, in my opinion as a professional trainer, training is rarely the required remedy. The typical causes of poor performance generally don’t spring from a lack of training.

Most of my experience was in the field of English language training. However, I spent about three and a half years overseas involved in technical training. I worked as a USG quality assurance monitor (QAM) of technical training provided by US contractors to foreign military personnel in various maintenance specialties. I spent 24 months in Country X and 18 in Country Y. In both cases the training was provided to support the country’s acquisition of a major weapons system. In country X, the training program was very successful. When the graduates reported to their operational units, their job performance met or exceeded expectations. In country Y, the program was a failure. Most of the graduates failed to meet expectations when they reported to their units. I found myself drafting letters to the contractor complaining of the poor performance of the graduates. After receiving several letters, one of the contractor senior managers sat me down and told me I was being unfair. He said that I witnessed the performance test given at the end of training to assess the qualifications of candidates. He was right. Most of the candidates were able to perform their required tasks. Those who were unable to perform were either eliminated from the program or recycled for additional training. Poor performers were not passed on to the operational units. Yet, paradoxically, the units were complaining that they could not perform required maintenance because of the poor performance of the majority of the graduates from technical training. The units were desperate and began to request that their personnel be given additional training.

Senior management seemed to think the solution to the problem was the requested additional training. Another training specialist and I wrote a point paper to explain that more training was not the solution to the problem. The initial training itself was demonstrably successful because the graduates were able to perform the required tasks. The problem was that the value system of the candidates didn’t mesh with program goals.

Most of the trainees told me that they had entered the program because of a lack of job opportunities. Economic necessity compelled them to get a job. The fly in the ointment was that they regarded blue collar work as beneath them. It wasn’t that they couldn’t perform the work; they didn’t perform the work because it was disgraceful for them to do so.

I suspect that the current insufficiency of Iraqi military units arises from factors other than training. The pontification of high ranking USG officials and of Fox News analysts notwithstanding, I suspect that training, while it must be accomplished, is not the principal impediment to Iraq’s fielding self-sufficient military forces.

So just what is preventing the Iraqi armed forces from achieving self-sufficient combat readiness. After all, we train American soldiers and deploy them in months. Some Iraqi units have been in training for three years. The American people are asking why it takes years to train Iraqi soldiers? Are the Iraqis stupid? Are the trainers incompetent? I suspect that neither is the case. I would bet that the Iraqis, given an equivalent amount of training, can perform all the standard tasks required of soldiers just as well as their American counterparts.

As I understand it, the problem is not that the Iraqis can’t hit what they are aiming at; it’s that they are not firing their weapons. Not hitting what you aim at can usually be remedied by training. Not firing your weapon indicates a lack of will to engage the enemy. This lack of will is symptomatic of poor morale. It is the same phenomenon that accounts for the sometimes enormous disparity in combat effectiveness between two equally trained combat units.

Patriotism is one element of morale. When we Americans hear our national anthem, it is an emotional, even euphoric, experience. We feel pride, gratitude, love of country. When we stand among 50,000 fellow Americans at a sports event and listen to the national anthem, we are all Americans. For that moment at least, no one cares where your ancestors came from or what your religious affiliation is. We feel an overpowering sense of unity.

When Iraqis hear their national anthem, I doubt that they feel the same emotions. Iraqi society is fragmented into family, tribal, ethnic, and religious groups. Primary allegiance is to these sub-groups. Civil war looms as a possibility. Exhorting an Iraqi to fight for his country might very well elicit the response, “What country?” Right now Iraq is an experiment

Unless the desired outcome is many tribal armies rather than a national army, the focus has to shift from teaching them how to fight to giving them the will to fight. Training per se will not necessarily give Iraqi soldiers a will to fight and die for their hypothetical country. Training answers the question “how”; it doesn’t answer the question “why”.

I believe the answer lies in creating elite Iraqi units. Elitism is a powerful motivator. Elite groups such as the Navy Seals, the French Foreign Legion, the Army Rangers and various US marine groups are marvelous warriors. They have that “je ne sais quoi”. Call it morale, spirit de corps, unit cohesiveness, or camaraderie, it creates formidable warriors. These men risk their lives to retrieve the body of a dead comrade and carry him for miles through inhospitable terrain in a harsh climate. Iraq doesn’t need hordes of uniformed men unwilling to fight for what may prove to be an imaginary country; it needs elite soldiers who kick ass. Whether they love their country becomes almost irrelevant. They will fight for one another. Soldiers in the French Foreign Legion don’t fight “pour la France”. Rather, they fight “pour la Legion”

The greatest pitfall in this approach is succumbing to the temptation for a quick fix. You can’t bestow morale on units; they have to earn morale by becoming elite. That is, they really have to excel. You can’t con them into thinking they are the best. Attempts to con them into feeling that they have achieved elitism create cynicism, the very antithesis of morale.

Elitism has to start at the top. The commanders of these units have to be the best and the brightest. They have to be the type of leaders with whom familiarity breeds admiration rather than contempt.

I may be wrong, but I don’ think so. You can't expect soldiers to die for a nation that isn't yet a nation. They have to have another reason.

Monday, January 02, 2006

US Foreign Language Deficit (Part 2 of 2)

- Working Assumptions

-- In view of the rickety FLT infrastructure in the United States, I am going to propose an all out war on the language expertise deficit. There are two basic assumptions inherent in my proposed approach. First it is assumed that, given the critical elements cited above, during four years of secondary school, students can achieve a fairly high level of proficiency in the target language. Second, it is assumed that most extant university FLT programs could not produce the number and quality of graduates that we require. Thus, there are two phases in my proposed approach. The first phase involves the establishment of FLT programs in secondary schools; and the second the establishment of university level enhanced
FLT programs.
- Recommendations (Phase I). The United States Government (USG) should establish an Interagency FLT Task Force to

-- Canvass federal agencies to ascertain their projected (eight to ten years out) requirements for foreign language experts.

-- Establish a network of FLT centers (FLTCs) on the secondary level (ninth through twelfth grades) throughout the US to create a pool of potential language experts to meet projected requirements. In concept, these FLTCs would function somewhat like charter high schools.

--- FLTC students should take

<> ---- Normal college preparatory courses, but, during each of the
four years, should have a minimum of five hours per week of training in the target language.

<> ---- A supplementary (i.e. in addition to the five hours) course in
reading newspapers and periodicals in the target language during their junior year

< > ---- A supplementary (i.e., in addition the five hours) area studies course during their senior year. This course should be given in the target language and should provide a broad overview of the geography, history, economy, religion, and political systems of the country or area in which the target language is spoken. <>

---- One-month of intensive (six hours per day) training in the target language during the summer after the ninth, tenth and eleventh grades. <>

-- Work out a formula with the various states to jointly fund these FLTCs.

-- Establish rigorous standards for admission into the FLTCs. Those selected for admission to these schools should have a high score on the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) language aptitude test, a high IQ, a strong academic background and a high level of motivation.

-- Provisionally select for admission students meeting these standards.

-- Require provisionally admitted students to successfully complete a one-month intensive (six hours per day) preparatory course in the target language in order to earn final admission into the ninth grade. Those demonstrating a lack of aptitude and /or motivation should be eliminated from training before entering the ninth grade in the FLTC.

-- Eliminate from the FLTCs students who fail to demonstrate that they possess the aptitude and/or motivation to become highly proficient in the target language.

-- Provide full scholarships to those earning admission.

-- Chooose language instructors who are highly qualified native speakers or Americans who approximate native speaker proficiency.
- Recommendations (Phase II). The Interagency Foreign Language Task Force should

-- Ideally, establish a national university to train the FLTC secondary school graduates to near native proficiency or, alternatively,

-- Work with various universities to develop programs suitable for training the FLTC graduates to near native proficiency.

-- Grant full scholarships to those secondary school FLTC graduates who

--- have demonstrated the potential to achieve near native proficiiency

--- agree to work for the federal government as a military member or a civilian employee for a minimum number of years.

-- Require students to major in the target language and minor in area studies. <>

--- Area studies should consist of in-depth courses on the history, economic and political systems, geography, and religion(s) of the country or area in which the target language is spoken.

--- All area studies courses should be taken in the target language.

--- Students should also be required to take at least one math course, one science course, and two other liberal arts courses in the target language.

-- Require students to perform internships during the summer to put their language skills to use in a real world environment.

--- Students should serve their internships in the country in which the target language is spoken. <>- General Recommendations. The knowledgeable reader will have noted that the approach above is more of concept than a plan. To transform this concept into a plan would be an enormous (and expensive) undertaking. The plan would have to encompass: budgeting: establishing the physical training facilities; selecting students; recruiting, screening, and hiring instructors and managers; adapting and developing curricula; developing academic standards; setting up an evaluation system; creating an achievement and proficiency testing system; and developing policy and procedural guidelines.

-- Below are recommendations for the planning and implementation of both phases, <> --- The foreign language proficiency testing instruments developed by DLIFLC and FSI should be used both to measure student proficiency in the target language and to evaluate the success of the FLTCs.

--- Experts from DLIFLC and FSI should participate in the Interagency Foreign Language Task Force. These two organizations are uniquely suited to this type of endeavor because they are repositories of expertise in language instruction, curriculum development, testing, and training evaluation and management. <>- Alternatives. Implementation of both phases of the FLT program outlined above would be an enormous undertaking. It would provide FLT on a scale far beyond anything ever attempted in the United States. It goes without saying that training on such a large scale would also be expensive. In my forty years of federal service, I don’t think I ever met a bean counter who would be inclined to approve such a program. It is the “Cadillac” plan. Are there cheaper alternatives to train Americans to a near native proficiency in foreign languages? I don’t think so.

--- Clone DLIFLC/FSI. One alternative might be to establish a DLIFLC or FSI clone. As pointed out above, these institutions, given the constraints under which they must operate, produce excellent results, but their graduates generally do not possess anything near native proficiency. They don’t produce “Cadillacs”; they produce “Chevies”. Some of the “Chevies” eventually morph into “Cadillacs”. It is not only time constraints that prevent these institutes from producing “Cadillacs”. The type of student is also a factor. Their typical students do not have a background in target languages such as Arabic and Korean. The chances are that they had never studied these languages prior to entering DLIFLC. If a DLIELC/FSI clone were expected to produce “Cadillacs: it would have to establish high entry standards or greatly extend the duration of the FLT. With respect to entry standards, students would have to already be “Chevies”. Given that the current FLT infrastructure produces a limited number of “Chevies”, it would still be necessary to establish FLTCs on the secondary or university level. With respect to extending the duration of training, I would guess that an extension of several years would be necessary.

--- Financial Incentives. Another alternative would be offering some kind of financial incentive to encourage students to study foreign languages in high school and college. This may be a worthwhile endeavor, but the typical high school and college foreign language programs won’t produce graduates with the high level of proficiency required. This approach would be more likely to produce a large number of “Edsels”, some “Chevies” and very few “Cadillacs”.

---- If the financial incentive approach should be adopted, the degree of success would depend on how incentives were meted out. Incentives would have to be meted out based degree of language proficiency, not on the number of courses “successfully” completed. The definition of successful course completion differs greatly from professor to professor and from institution to institution. Fiscal prudence would dictate that financial aid be tied to the level of target language proficiency achieved as measured by DLIFLC proficiency tests. Given the current FLT infrastructure, very few “Cadillacs” would be produced.

----Trying to train the masses to a high level of proficiency in a foreign language would be a wasteful extravagance. If the United States is going to invest money in FLT, it should get a return on its investment. If a choice must be made between investing in the delivery of a little FLT to a lot of students or a lot of FLT to a few students, our national interests dictate that we opt for “lot to a few” than “a little to a lot”. The “few " should be composed of those students with levels of aptitude and motivation sufficient to achieve near native proficiency in the target language. We don’t need several million graduates whose level of Arabic is sufficient to utter the Arabic equivalent of such phrases as “Me want soup.” We need several thousand who can function at a level of Arabic sufficient to interrogate prisoners, interpret technical conversations, translate complex documents, and negotiate treaties, <> --- There is yet another alternative. Rather than spending a lot of money to train Americans, the USG could employ native speakers born in the United States or abroad. Superficially, this appears to be an ideal solution because, assuming a sufficient number of native speakers can be found, it is relatively cheap and it eliminates the long lead time required to train native English speakers to the required level of proficiency in the target language. Upon closer scrutiny this solution loses some of its luster. The following drawbacks probably render this approach no more than a partial solution:


---- Native speakers born in the United State generally do not receive their education in the native language and do not possess the high level of proficiency required. True, in one sense they are native speakers but their level of proficiency in the language tends to be limited to what I would call “domestic” Arabic or Persian. Moreover, they don’t read books, magazines or newspapers in the language. Also, even where there is some programming available I the target language, they tend not to watch these programs. They generally prefer programs in English. As one might expect, they generally don’t possess a great deal of knowledge about their countries of origin. In a word, their linguistic competence has been limited by their linguistically poor environment.

---- While native speakers born and educated abroad often have the required skills in the target language, frequently they lack the required English language proficiency. We are then confronted with the problem of providing them with English language training. There is also another fly in the ointment. It may be impolitic to say so, but one must always wonder, when push comes to shove, whose side such native speakers are on.

---- Native speakers born abroad and those born in the United States are likely to have relatives or close friends in the country of origin. Some foreign intelligence services wouldn’t hesitate to use these relatives as leverage to compromise our native speakers. - Approach vs. Plan. The informed reader will have noted that the two-phased approach outlined above is a concept more than a plan. I leave the planning, the hard part, to others. Developing a comprehensive plan would be a daunting enterprise. Just the thought of getting cooperation from various participating federal agencies and states is enough to intimidate even the most competent bureaucrat. <>

- Rome is burning. Let’s put away the fiddle.

Sunday, January 01, 2006

US Foreign Language Deficit (Part 1 of 2)

By

<>Tom Molloy

- The purpose of this article is twofold: to emphasize the gravity of the foreign language expertise deficit in United States intelligence agencies and to propose an approach to eliminate this deficit. All opinions expressed in article are my own.

<>- Gravity of Deficit.

<>-- I am going to begin by making some comments on the grave consequences of the foreign language expertise deficit. I am then going to question the competence of senior officials in the intelligence community who presided over the degradation of foreign language expertise. My remarks are, to say the least, presumptuous because I can claim no expertise in the intelligence field. If you were to ask me whether I have any experience that qualifies me to critique the intelligence community. My response would be, “No, but I can walk and chew gum at the same time.”

<>-- One keeps reading that the diminution of foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community has degraded our intelligence gathering capability. To a layman, given the fact that most people who intend to do us dirty conspire in languages other than English, it appears self-evident that foreign language expertise is a vital component of intelligence gathering. It is stupefying that the intelligence community so devalued foreign language expertise as an asset that it let our pool of foreign language experts dwindle to such a dangerously low level. The ordinary citizen has to wonder who’s minding the store. Intelligence experts, at least those on cable TV news shows, confess that our infatuation with technology together with decreased funding led to a reduction in the cadre of language experts. Apparently, the import of the language expertise defict, obvious to any amateur who reads spy novels, was revealed to the intelligence professionals by the apocalyptic intelligence failure manifested on 9/11.

<>-- Although I claim no expertise in the intelligence field, I do claim to be an expert. My expertise is language training. I worked for almost 40 years as an instructor, manager and consultant in the language training business. For 38 of those years, I worked for the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC). I have experience in every aspect of language training. I have taught English and several foreign languages. I have also served in various DLIELC management positions and did consulting on language training program management in over twenty foreign countries and for several major corporations. In this paper I am going to play the consultant and give unsolicited advice to the intelligence community

<>-- Technology can search out and record an Al-Qaeda member’s phone call, but as far as I know, it can’t reliably interpret what was said. To close the loop, we still need a low tech component: someone proficient in Arabic. Moreover, I suspect that human agents, fluent in Arabic, who hobnob with the indigenous population of Damascus, are potentially worth their weight in satellite photos. Although I have never worked in the intelligence field, based on my long experience as a federal employee, I just know that there were some junior intelligence officers who said to their bosses, “You know, boss, we keep recording and filing the conversations of suspected terrorists. Don’t you think we should have someone who knows Arabic listen to these conversations?” And I just know that these courageous junior officers did not engage in such impertinence with impunity. Somewhere in their performance evaluations appear such notations as, “Needs to be more of a team player.” or “Has youthful enthusiasm, but lacks wisdom from experience.”

<> -- I know that the 9/11 commission, composed of distinguished individuals, identified the dearth of foreign language expertise in intelligence agencies as a significant problem, but exonerated the chiefs of any blame. Reportedly, the goal of the commission was to ascertain what mistakes were made so we could take measures not to repeat them in the future. The goal was not to crucify those who made the mistakes. On the one hand, this “amnesty” is entirely understandable. It is difficult to elicit cooperation in an investigation if the officials in the agencies under investigation believe they are going to be crucified for telling the truth. On the other hand, the consequences of this “amnesty” don’t bode well for the nation. We are leaving in the corridors of power chiefs, who among other derelictions, didn’t ensure that there was a sufficient cadre of foreign language experts to successfully conduct intelligence operations. Instead of accountability, we have exhortations to incompetents to behave competently from now on. Something like: “Because mommy loves you, she’s not going to punish you this time for burning down our house with daddy and all your brothers and sisters inside, but I must ask you, in the future to be more careful where you play with those infernal incendiary devices you keep building. Give mommy a kiss goodnight and say your prayers before going to bed.”

<>-- I can’t help but think that 9/11 might have been another ordinary, run-of-the mill day if our intelligence community had possessed the language expertise necessary to interpret communications by suspected terrorists as soon as they were intercepted. Conceivably, at this very moment, there are transcripts awaiting translation or prisoners awaiting interrogation that have information about the plans for another major act of terrorism.

<>- Current State of Foreign Language Training (FLT) in the United States < -- Overview. There is probably no satisfactory quick fix which will yield a pool of experts in such languages as Arabic, Farsi, Tajik and Uzbek. Producing a sufficient number of foreign language specialists to make up the deficit will take years. In bookstores one sees foreign language instruction materials with such titles as : ”Learn Russian While You Drive to Work”, ”French in 30 Days”, “Arabic in 20 Minutes a Day”. Some of these materials are quite useful, but one has to be quite gullible to believe that one can achieve a significant degree of proficiency in such a short time. In fact, achieving a high level of proficiency in a foreign language requires years of study and practice. It generally takes four to six years to train a highly motivated individual with superior language learning aptitude to a high level of proficiency in languages such as Arabic or Korean.

<>--- A successful FLT program contains the following critical elements:

<>---- Institutional seriousness of purpose manifested by rigorously
enforced high standards and a consequent high level of academic attrition. <>

---- Elitism. Students selected for admission must have both high motivation and superior language learning aptitude. <>

---- Excellent instruction. Instructors must possess academic qualifications, but more importantly, they must excel in delivering instruction in the classroom.

<>---- Lots of training time. There are no short cuts, no nostrums, and
no miracles. Talent, time and dedication are required.

-- The goal of intelligence agencies should be to have a pool of foreign language experts whose level of proficiency is native or near native. After forty years in the language training field, it is my considered opinion that the US does not now have the infrastructure to produce the number and quality of language experts the nation requires. Neither secondary, nor university nor USG-conducted FLT are adequate to meet the nation’s need for foreign language experts. The intelligence community requires “Cadillacs", and the current infrastructure produces many “Edsels”, some Chevies” and very few “Cadillacs”.

--- Secondary Level. In Europe a great deal is accomplished in FLT on the secondary level. Many secondary school students graduate with a fairly high level of proficiency. In US secondary schools, the quality of FLT is generally abysmal an relatively few students study a foreign language. To be sure, there are exceptions, but, on the whole, expectations are low and few serious demands are made of students. No one really expects students who study French in high school to become proficient in French. Hopefully, the student who successfully completes high school French is able to utter a few mispronounced greetings in the language, knows that Paris is the capital of France, can show the location of France on a map, knows that the French eat snails, and knows that the French really love us, but have difficulty showing it. Recently, at a social gathering, I asked several secondary school foreign language (Spanish, German, French) teachers why proficiency expectations were so low. One of them explained that the goal of FLT was to bring the students to an appreciation of cultural diversity. I didn’t get a chance to pursue this intriguing concept, but I can’t help wondering if, in the cultural diversity appreciation paradigm, achieving a high level of proficiency somehow lessens one’s appreciation of cultural diversity. The cultural diversity appreciation paradigm sounded to me like a rationalization for low standards. In the course of the evening, I did learn that my survival French was superior to the French spoken by the French teacher. Therein may lie one of the reasons for the low FLT standards.

<>- University Level. With respect to the current quality of the FLT in universities, I have no recent first-hand knowledge of the quality of this training. I have not been in a foreign language class in a university since the early 1980s. Expectations were very low. However, during my career in the ELT field, I had the opportunity to interact with many individuals who had majored in foreign languages. Based on these contacts, I believe that many Americans with a BA in German or French do not speak these languages as well as the typical German or French college prep school graduate speaks English. It is my opinion that proficiency standards for US university students may be lower than those for French or German high school students. That is to say, that the typical graduate who majored in a foreign language is not the solution to our problem. With respect to the variety of foreign languages offered, there are very few universities which offer Arabic or Farsi as a major and fewer still that offer even a single course in Uzbek or Pashto. From the national security perspective, French is nice, but Arabic and Farsi are a must. Some universities are reputed to have outstanding FLT programs. The universities that make such a claim should have the opportunity to demonstrate their competence during the implementation of the approach outlined below.

-- USG Language Schools. Among USG foreign language schools, there are two that are particularly noteworthy: The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey CA and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) in Washington D.C. These institutions provide intensive FLT for periods of time up to a year or more. The number of weeks of training depends on the difficulty of the target language. Italian, for example is classified as a relatively easy language for speakers of English to learn and Korean is classified as among the most difficult. Hence, the length of the Korean course is approximately twice that of the Italian course. Given the time constraints under which these institutes operate, they produce excellent results. Nevertheless, their graduates generally do not possess anything near native proficiency. They don’t produce “Cadillacs”; they produce “Chevies”. Some of the Chevies eventually morph into “Cadillacs”. It is not only time constraints that prevent these institutes from producing “Cadillacs”. Another constraint is that, with reference to the target language, the typical student enters these institutes as a “tabula rasa”. They have no prior training in the target language. <>

To be continued.